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THE INFLUENCE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
FEAR OF CRIME ON JUDGMENTS OF RATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION
SAERA R. KHAN
University of San Francisco
CHRISTINA A. BYRNE
Western Washington University
KAY LIVESAY
Linfield College
Female undergraduates rated the rationality of using gender stereotypes in several
potentially dangerous situations. We tested whether sexual assault history and fear
of crime moderated perceptions of the use of gender stereotypes in public and pri-
vate settings. Primary results revealed differences in ratings among victims and
nonvictims of sexual assault as a function of type of setting. Additionally, fear of
crime increased ratings of rationality in nighttime public situations. The implica-
tions of these results are discussed in the context of the “rational discrimination”
phenomenon (Khan & Lambert, 2001).
Although social psychologists have extensively studied prejudice and
stereotyping over the past 50 years, a debate that began in philosophy
(see Levin, 1991; Cox, 1993; Pojman, 1993; Thomas, 1992) has renewed
interest in the relation between rationality and discrimination (e.g.,
Zawadzki, 1948). This debate moved to the national spotlight when so-
cial critic Dinesh D’Souza provocatively accused liberals of perceiving
many behaviors as racist when in fact these behaviors reflected rational
thinking. In particular, some discriminatory behaviors need not be
linked to prejudicial or negative group attitudes at all (D’Souza, 1995).
According to D’Souza, the discriminatory act of cabdrivers refusing
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Black fares is the rational product of statistical risk assessment.1
D’Souza’s arguments have not gone uncriticized (see Loury, 1996). Nev-
ertheless, the perceived relationship between rationality and prejudice
has been an understudied phenomenon in social psychology (but see
Khan & Lambert, 2001).
PREVIOUS STUDY
Several theories can be used to predict if prejudicial attitudes influence
whether discrimination is perceived as rational. For example, the
“scapegoat” theory of prejudice describes how perceivers often view
prejudicial attitudes and behaviors as rational responses toward
outgroup members despite the absence of indisputable evidence sup-
porting their negative characterization, (Janoff–Bulman, Timko, & Carli,
1985; Wagstaff, 1982; Allport, 1954; Zawadzki, 1948). According to
Allport (1954), this rationalization conceals perceivers’ aversion or hos-
tility to the target. In contrast, the “well–earned reputation” theory ar-
gues that groups are treated on the basis of the reputation they have
earned (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Grant, 1990; Zawadzki, 1948). Therefore,
negative treatment or discrimination is deserved. Of course the reputa-
tion itself may be tainted with irrelevant factors such as attitudes toward
the outgroup. In addition, perceivers may choose to selectively focus on
analytical information to bolster a pre–existing judgment. Finally, an-
other theory of prejudice represents a “convergence” between the scape-
goat and the well–earned reputation theories (Zawadzki, 1948;
Ichheiser, 1949). This convergence theory suggests that both groups in
question are responsible, in part, for the discriminatory behavior. Ac-
cording to Zawadzki, “…Prejudice is a result of an interaction (more es-
pecially, conflict) of both groups and the characteristics of both groups
must be involved in its explanation” (p. 133). In this case, Zawadzki does
not specify the extent to which each group is responsible for the resulting
conflict. Instead, he cautions that subjective factors, such as prejudicial
attitudes, most likely outweigh objective ones.
PRESENT STUDY
Thus far, discussions of rational discrimination have primarily centered
on ethnic or racial intergroup relations. To our knowledge, no one has
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1. Prejudice is defined here as one’s affective or emotional response to members of a par-
ticular social group.
theoretically or empirically explored the relation between rationality
and prejudice in other group domains such as gender. Examining gen-
der discrimination is important because how people judge discrimina-
tion considered relatively more socially acceptable remains unclear.
Gender discrimination may be perceived differently from the type of
discrimination depicted in D’Souza’s cabdriver example not only be-
cause of its widespread practice but also because perceivers may see
similarities between themselves and the discriminator. For example,
many people see it is as prudent or rational when a woman exercises
caution around unfamiliar men (Khan, 2003). If a woman does not allow
a male stranger to use the phone or if she crosses the street at night to
avoid a lone male, it does not result in the same protest as race–based
discrimination. Discrimination against males is not seen as reprehensi-
ble to society at large since many men advocate this practice and do not
seem to suffer seriously adverse consequences.2 In this case, some may
argue that acts of gender discrimination can be explained by the
well–deserved reputation theory in that people may resort to negative
personal experiences as their defense.
Examining gender discrimination of this sort allows an examination
of whether personal experience influences judgments of rationality. Sev-
eral theories have been proposed to explain how past behavior or experi-
ence influences beliefs about present and future behaviors (for a test of
these models, see Albarracin & Wyer, 2000). Although this study does
not test the viability of each model, any of these models provides sup-
port for the notion that past experience influences judgments and behav-
ior. We are particularly interested in how past experience might reaffirm
or increase the tendency to approve of certain forms of discrimination.
In this study, personal experience is primarily conceptualized in two
ways: personal fear of crime, and sexual assault history. We assume that
although both of these constructs may be related, they are distinct from
each other and will lead to different predictions depending on the type
of setting in which the discrimination takes place. We assume that even
if women are not victims of crimes, their fear of crime influences the ex-
tent to which they assess situations as dangerous or not. Although fear
of crime is not as strong of an “experience” as is sexual assault, women
with relatively higher levels of fear of crime might perceive a greater
similarity between their own behavior and that of the woman depicted
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2. Although it is important to understand people’s responses to socially normative dis-
crimination, it is beyond the intent or scope of this article to debate why this difference in
racial and gender scenarios exists. Moreover, addressing whether or not our participants’
judgments are appropriate is not the aim of this article.
in the scenarios in the present study (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce,
1996). Dissonance theory suggests that women who score high in the
fear of crime are likely to rate discriminatory behavior arising out of fear
as rational and not reflective of prejudice.
Victims of personal crimes might be more sensitized to aspects of a sit-
uation reminding them of their prior experience. Many sexual assault
victims experience increased fear and anxiety that may continue for
months or years following the assault (Calhoun, Atkeson, & Resick,
1982; Kilpatrick, Resick, & Veronen, 1981; Resick, Calhoun, Atkeson, &
Ellis, 1981). Fear and effortful avoidance of assault-related stimuli, pos-
sibly including assailant’s demographic features (e.g., age, sex, or race)
or particular locations, is not uncommon following criminal victimiza-
tion (Foa, Riggs, & Gershuny, 1995; Kilpatrick, Veronen, & Best, 1985).
The setting in which the discrimination takes place will determine if
personal experience is seen as relevant and used as a guide for whether
the behavior is judged as rational or not. For example, because most sex-
ual assaults take place in private settings such as a home or dormitory
room (BJS, 2000, 2001), we predict that sexual assault victims compared to
nonvictims will be more attuned to potential dangers in private settings.
Therefore, sexual assault victims will regard the use of gender stereotypes
in potentially dangerous situations as more rational in a private setting
than would women without a sexual assault history. Fear of crime, on the
other hand, is most likely salient when in public as opposed to private set-
tings and therefore will predict people’s judgments of rationality for situ-
ations that take place in public settings. The key ways in which the scenar-
ios are designed to maximize differences in judgments by victim status
and fear of crime are further discussed in the Method section.
This study examines whether personal experience influences the ex-
tent to which people view gender-based discrimination as rational or
not. We predict that the type of setting (public vs. private) will influence
the extent to which types of personal experiences will be used as a basis
for judgment. In particular, we predict that victims of sexual assault
compared to nonvictims will more likely view the discrimination as ra-
tional in a private setting. Also, we predict that participant’s fear of
crime will be used as a guide for judgment of discrimination in a public
setting as opposed to the private setting. Most importantly, we do not
expect results to replicate across different scenarios. That is, different
scenarios were constructed precisely to test whether fear of crime and
sexual assault history differentially predicts responses to scenarios. In
addition to the public and private setting scenarios, we included a sce-
nario where the interaction takes place in a semi–private setting. This
scenario was included for exploratory reasons as we did not have a clear
idea of how sexual assault victims or people high in fear of crime would
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respond. Nevertheless, we thought it would be useful to see if personal
experiences are used as a guide for judgments in settings irrelevant to
their experiences. In the same vein, we also included a racial discrimina-
tion scenario to examine the generalizability of judgments to other
groups. Furthermore, this scenario serves as a control in that group
equivalence on ratings of rationality in one scenario for all participants
can be established. The relation between prejudicial attitudes and
ratings of rationality was also assessed so that we could explore if there
are differences in how people link prejudice with discrimination.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 138 female undergraduate students participated in this study
in return for partial fulfillment of a course credit.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
A female experimenter administered packets to small groups of partici-
pants. Participants were assured of their anonymity and did not write
any identifying information on the packets. The packets contained two
parts: (a) gender- and race–based scenarios followed by questions eval-
uating the young woman and the cabdriver, and (b) questionnaires as-
sessing fear of crime, and personal trauma history. After completing the
packet, participants were thoroughly debriefed and provided with in-
formation for campus and community resources in the event that they
experienced psychological distress after completing the study. To our
knowledge, no participants appeared to be distressed or sought help
following their involvement in the study.
Rational Discrimination Study Stimulus Materials
The following is an excerpt of the instructions received by participants:
In everyday life, we often have the opportunity to observe the decisions
that other people make. Sometimes their decisions seem like “good de-
cisions” and represent the best course of action they could have taken,
but in other cases their decisions seem like “bad decisions” and do not
represent the best course of action.
The order of scenarios was counterbalanced so that half the subjects read
and evaluated the cabdriver scenario first and the female scenario sec-
ond (order 1), whereas for order 2 participants read the scenarios in re-
verse order. In the cabdriver scenario, John does not pick up a young
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Black male out of safety concerns (for more details on the scenario, see
Khan & Lambert, 2001). Afterward, participants rated the driver with re-
spect to the rationality of his decision and their perception of his person-
ality. Because the primary interest of this article is to examine the role of
personal experience in judging the use of stereotypes by others, we will
report on the female scenario followed by the cabdriver scenario.
Gender-Based Discrimination Scenarios
Participants read one of three possible scenarios about Ann, a female who
is close in age to most undergraduate students. Each scenario was con-
structed to realistically represent a potentially dangerous situation that a
woman might encounter. The scenarios differ from each other in many
ways but in particular, we varied the scenarios so that they ranged along a
private to a public continuum. The most private situation takes place in
her dormitory room. In the semi-private situation, Ann is in an elevator. In
the public situation, Ann is on a street. We hypothesized that the type of
setting would provide different cues for danger depending on partici-
pants’ personal experience with sexual assault or fear of crime. In particu-
lar, women with a sexual assault history might be sensitized to dangers
related to private settings than women who have not experienced sexual
assault. Participants who report high fear of crime might be more cautious
in a public rather than in a private setting, compared to participants with
low fear in crime. Although it is relatively rare to hear about crimes taking
place in semi–private scenarios and it is difficult to predict what types of
cues will sensitize participants to potential danger in this scenario, it was
included for exploratory reasons. Primary analyses focused on the public
and private scenarios only.3
Private Scenario. Ann had just moved to Denver to start college. She
was excited about college and eager to meet many new and interesting
people at her school. On Wednesday, April 18th at approximately 10
p.m., Ann was studying in her dorm room when she heard a knock on
the door.
Ann got up to answer her door. When she opened her door, she no-
ticed that it was a guy who looked familiar to her. He asked if he could
use her telephone because the one in his room was not working prop-
erly. Ann made an excuse that she was waiting for a long-distance phone
call from her mother and suggested that he use the phone in the lobby
downstairs. When he left, Ann thought to herself, “even though he
might think that I was rude, it’s better to be safe than sorry."
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3. Results from the semi-private condition showed floor effects; therefore discussion of
these results is explored in the General Discussion.
Semi–private Scenario. Ann had just moved to Boston after graduat-
ing from college. She looked forward to seeing the new and exciting
sights she had heard so much about. On Wednesday, April 18th at ap-
proximately 3 p.m., Ann was waiting for the elevator to take her to an
appointment on the fourth floor of the building. While waiting, Ann
mentally went over the list of errands she needed to do after her ap-
pointment.
When the elevator door opened, Ann noticed that there was only one
man in the elevator. Ann immediately turned around and waited for the
next elevator. Ann thought to herself “I’d rather be a few minutes late for
my appointment and be safe, than be sorry.”
Public Scenario. Ann Johnson had just graduated from college and
started her new job in Denver. She was excited about living in a new place
and seeing the new sights she had heard so much about. On Wednesday,
April 18th, Ann had to work until 8 p.m. to help her boss meet a project
deadline.
The bus station was only a few blocks from her office. As she walked
down the street, Ann noticed a man on the same side of the street who
was about to pass her. Ann crossed the street before she encountered this
person. As Ann crossed the street, she thought to herself, “even though
he might think that I was rude, it’s better to be safe than sorry.”
Assessment of Dependent Variables
Quality of Decision. After reading each of the scenarios, participants as-
sessed the quality of the decision and their impression of that person. Par-
ticipants rated the decision along a scale ranging from –5 (a very bad deci-
sion) to +5 (a very good decision). Using a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to
10 (very much so), they also answered six questions concerning the per-
ceived rationality of the decision (“To what extent do you see his/her be-
havior as appropriate for the given situation?” “To what extent do you
view the decision as rational?” “To what extent do you see Ann as thinking
logically in this situation?” “To what extent do you sympathize with Ann’s
predicament?” “Do you think that Ann felt any anxiety or guilt before or af-
ter she made her decision?” How often do you think such events really
occur?” )
Personality Judgments. Participants answered questions pertaining to
their overall impressions of Ann along a scale ranging from –5 (very un-
favorable) to +5 (very favorable). Using a scale ranging from 0 (not at all)
to 10 (extremely), participants then rated her with respect to five general
personality traits (rational, intelligent, hostile, likable, and cautious).
Ratings of Prejudice. Using the same 0–10 scale, participants rated the
extent to which they thought Ann had a negative attitude toward men.
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Ratings of Personal Behavior
Participants also reported the extent to which they behaved similarly to
Ann using a 0 (never) to 10 scale (very often). “Please indicate how often
you behaved similarly to Ann in this scenario? That is, were you cau-
tious or afraid of someone because they were male?”
Assessment of Fear of Crime and Sexual Assault History
Fear of Crime. Fear of crime was assessed using a modified version of
the fear of crime questionnaire utilized in the Fear of Crime in America
Survey (Ferraro, 1996). Respondents used a ten–point Likert–type scale
to indicate their level of fear regarding 12 different crimes. Crimes in-
cluded property crimes, such as “someone breaking into your home
while you are away” and “having your car stolen,” and personal crimes,
such as “being sexually harassed,” “being raped or sexually assaulted,”
and “being attacked by someone with a weapon.” Possible responses
ranged from 1 (not at all afraid) to 10 (very afraid).
Sexual Assault History. Sexual assault history was obtained in two ways.
First, after completing the Fear of Crime measure, participants were asked
to indicate whether or not they had actually experienced each of the crimes
listed. Thus, women were asked directly if they had ever been raped or sex-
ually assaulted. Second, participants completed the Traumatic Stress Sur-
vey (TSS; Gallagher, Riggs, Byrne, & Weathers, 1998), a self–report measure
used to assess the occurrence of highly stressful life events. The TSS in-
cludes 20 stressful events, including behaviorally specific descriptions of
sexual assault such as “someone, including a friend, partner, or family
member, used physical force or threat of physical force to make you have
sexual intercourse with them when you did not want to.” Respondents in-
dicated which of the stressful events on the list they experienced.
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Sufficient variability in sexual assault history was obtained. As expected
from prior data on sexual assault prevalence, (BJS, 2000), 62% of the par-
ticipants (N = 85) did not identify as victims of sexual assault and 38% of
the participants (N = 53) reported having been victims of sexual assault
in the Traumatic Stress Survey questionnaire.4 An analysis was first con-
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4. Of these 53 participants, 25 responded “yes” to the question “Have you ever been raped
or sexually assaulted?” Twenty–four of these individuals indicated that their attacker was
male and 20 reported knowing their attacker. The 28 other participants indicated sexual as-
sault on the TSS questionnaire. These numbers are consistent with prior research indicating
that many women do not label their experiences with forced, unwanted sexual intercourse
as rape (BJS, 2000; Koss, 1988, 1992).
ducted to assess whether group differences existed between sexual as-
sault victims and nonvictims in fear of crime. The distribution of scores
revealed that fear of crime was normally distributed across both
groups.5 A one–way analysis of variance revealed no difference between
groups on fear of crime, F(1, 135) = 3.36, p > .05. This finding is important
because it suggests that victims and nonvictims have equivalent
concerns about crime.
A principal factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was con-
ducted to create an index of perceived rationality across the public and
private scenarios. Questions regarding the quality of Ann’s decision
were included in this analysis. The analysis revealed two factors with
eigenvalues greater than 1. However, the scree plot revealed a large de-
cline in eigenvalues between the first and second factors (3.97 to 1.14).
On the basis of these results, an index was created only out of the first
factor, which captured 57% of the variance and was comprised of five
items representing the rationality of Ann’s decision (i.e., appraisal of her
decision, appropriate, rational, logical, sympathize). From this point on
in the article, analyses examining rationality of decision are based on
this index (alpha = .95).
A second principal factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was
conducted to create an index for ratings of Ann’s personality across sce-
narios. Here, two factors also had eigenvalues greater than 1. Similarly,
the scree plot revealed a large decline between the first and second fac-
tors (eigenvalues = 3.60 vs. 1.10). Therefore a composite was created
only out of the first factor. The first factor accounted for 51% of the vari-
ance and represented judgments of Ann’s personality with respect to ra-
tionality. A composite of these three items (overall impression, intelli-
gence, and rationality) was created, alpha = .93. From this point on,
analyses involving Ann’s personality are based on this index.
PRIMARY ANALYSES
A hierarchical regression analysis was used to analyze the rationality of
the decision as a function of the setting of the encounter (public vs. pri-
vate), assault history, and fear of crime. Because sexual assaults gener-
ally occur in private settings, we expected to find that victims would rate
the decision as more rational in this setting compared to the public set-
INFLUENCE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 971
5. One participant was dropped from the analysis for failure to complete the Fear of
Crime scale. Regression diagnostics to examine influential outliers with high leverage re-
vealed two extreme cases in the cabdriver scenario but not in the female scenario. These
two cases were dropped prior to cabdriver analyses.
ting. We also predicted that fear of crime would influence participants’
responses in the public scenario so that higher levels of fear of crime
would be associated with higher ratings of rationality.6 Hierarchical re-
gression revealed two significant two-way interactions, ([R2 = .16, F(3,
87) = 2.53, p < .01, for step 2, R2 change from main effects model = .114]).
The first interaction involved assault history by type of setting. The sec-
ond one involved fear of crime and type of setting. The three-way inter-
action was not significant, R2 change = .03, p =.10. Each effect will be
discussed separately below. Hierarchical regression analyses involving
the same three independent variables with ratings of Ann’s personality
paralleled these results with two two way interactions involving the
same variables, ([R2 = .16, F(3, 87) = 2.70, p < .01, for step 2, R2 change from
main effects model = .116]). These ratings of personality will be
presented in conjunction with the ratings of the decision.
Ratings of Rationality and Personality by Assault History and Type of Setting.
The first two way interaction involved assault history and type of set-
ting on ratings of rationality of decision, ([β = .99, SE = .42, t(88) = 2.34, p <
.02]). As can be seen in Table 1, the predicted pattern was confirmed. Vic-
tims of sexual assault rated her decision as more rational in the private
setting compared to nonvictims (M = 8.09 vs. 6.95). That is, assault vic-
tims viewed her decision not to let a male use her phone as more rational
than did nonvictims. A simple effects test reveals this difference to be
marginally significant, F(1, 48) = 3.66, p = .06. Interestingly, the pattern of
ratings in the public setting (i.e., crossing the street) are reversed so that
nonvictims rated her decision as more rational than did victims, but the
difference is not significant, F(1, 43) = 2.22, p = .14. Importantly, ratings
of Ann’s personality mirrored these results. There was a significant
two-way interaction involving assault history and type of setting, ([β =
.80, SE = .34, t (88) = 2.35, p < .02). In this case as well, victims rated her
personality as relatively more rational in the private condition (M = 6.39,
SD = 1.63) than did nonvictims (M = 5.64, SD = 1.66). A simple effects test
revealed the difference to be nonsignificant, F(1, 48) = 2.33, p = .13.
Nonvictims rated her personality as more rational in the public setting
(M = 6.25, SD = 1.25) compared to victims (M = 5.39, SD = 2.02) and this
difference was not significant, F(1, 43) = 2.96, p = .09. A greater sample
size would most likely yield significant simple effects tests; nevertheless
the patterns obtained are consistent with our predictions. Taken to-
gether as a whole, these two sets of significant interactions indicate that
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6. Because preliminary analyses revealed that order did not influence ratings on its own
or interact with other variables it is not mentioned in the discussion of the results.
sexual assault history and type of setting influenced participants’
judgments of rationality.
Importantly, our findings were confirmed when we compared the ef-
fects of the private and public scenarios with the control scenario depict-
ing a cabdriver. Regardless of whether participants were assigned to
read the public or private scenario, their ratings of the rationality for the
cabdriver did not vary as a function of prior assault history, F(2, 135) <
1.0, p > .10. This finding is important for two reasons. First, it shows that
the differences between victims and nonvictims’ ratings of rationality do
not generalize across irrelevant settings. Second, this finding demon-
strates that the groups were equivalent on ratings of rationality prior to
their assignment to story conditions. Thus, any differences in ratings of
rationality found in the gender scenarios cannot be attributed to
pre–existing and unaccounted for differences among our participants.
Correlation between Prejudice and Ratings of Rationality. Correlational
analyses were conducted to examine whether prior experience of sexual
assault increased justifications of discriminatory behavior in public and
private settings in the gender scenarios. It stands to reason that the more
participants view a decision as rational, the less they view it as prejudi-
cial. As expected when the setting was private, ratings of rationality and
prejudice correlated r = –.74, p < .001 among victims, but not among
nonvictims, r = –.27, p = .16, 7 Z for the difference = 2.12, p < .01. (see Table
2). In contrast, for the public setting, correlational analyses revealed
non–significant negative correlations between Ann’s rationality and
prejudice among victims, r = –.39, p =.10, and nonvictims, r = –.22, p = .31,
Victims appear to justify their ratings of rationality in the private setting.
This finding points to a greater incidence of rationalization of discrimi-
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TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Rationality of Decision by
Assault History
Assault History
Scenario Victims Nonvictims
Private 8.09 (SD = 1.48) 6.95 (SD = 2.32)
Public 6.84 (SD = 2.31) 7.76 (SD = 1.72)
Cab driver (control) 3.28 (SD = 1.73) 3.61 (SD = 1.76)
Semi–private 3.40 (SD = 2.40) 3.79 (SD = 1.60)
7. The –.27 correlation is nonsignificant, suggesting large variability in scores.
natory behavior in the exact situation predicted as subjectively danger-
ous for them. It appears that victims and nonvictims construe the link
between prejudice and discrimination differently when it comes to
gender-based scenarios. These results will be explored in greater depth
in the Discussion.
The relationship between ratings of the cabdriver’s rationality and
prejudice toward Blacks was also examined. First, the mean rating for
the cabdriver’s prejudice was fairly high, 7.65. The zero-order correla-
tion between rationality and prejudice was significant r = –.38, p < .001.
Regardless of victim status, there was a significantly negative correla-
tion between ratings of rationality and prejudice (please refer to Table 4).
In this case, the correlation was stronger for nonvictims (r = –.59) than it
was for victims (r = –.25), Z for the difference = 1.94, p < .03.
Ratings of Rationality by Fear of Crime and Type of Setting. The second
significant interaction involved fear of crime and type of setting, ([β = –.44,
SE = .21, t(88) = –2.09, p < .04]). As predicted and shown in Figure 1, fear of
crime positively relates to ratings of rationality in the public but not in the
private setting. In the public setting, ratings of rationality of the decision
increased across levels of fear of crime whereas in the private condition,
fear of crime, played no role in ratings of rationality. This finding is com-
plemented by the ratings of Ann’s personality. Ratings of her personality
were influenced by fear of crime and type of setting, ([β = –0.33, SE = .17, t
(88) = –1.93, p = .06]). A similar pattern emerges here so that participants
relatively higher in fear of crime rated her as a more rational person in the
public than in the private setting. Therefore, as predicted, fear of crime
plays a significant role in reactions to the decision and Ann but only when
the discrimination takes place in a public setting.
DISCUSSION
Primary results in this study suggest that personal experiences do come
into play when judging discriminatory behaviors. In particular, the type
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TABLE 2. Correlation Matrix of Rationality of Decision and Prejudice Measures by
Setting and Sexual Assault History
Scenario Victims Nonvictims
Private –.74** –.27
Public –.39 –.22
Cab Scenario (control) –.25* –.59**
Note. *p < .05;**p < .001.
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of setting helps determine the type of personal experience used for judg-
ment. Prior to conducting this study, we hypothesized that experience
with sexual assault might make women more cautious and more likely
to endorse discrimination. However, we understood that certain fea-
tures such as public and private settings could produce differences in
ratings of rationality in the scenarios.
At the outset, one might predict that experiencing sexual assault
would predispose victims to constantly practice rational discrimination,
especially when it came to gender-based scenarios. However, our find-
ings demonstrate that victims of sexual assault make distinctions among
gender- and race-based scenarios. In the cabdriver scenario, both vic-
tims and nonvictims responded similarly. In the private setting (i.e.,
phone) scenario, however, victims gave higher ratings of rationality
compared to nonvictims. Interestingly, experience with sexual assault
produced the opposite effect in the scenario taking place in the public
setting (i.e., street scenario). Nonvictims reacted more strongly to a situ-
ation depicted in our culture and media as dangerous, namely the street
scenario; in this case, nonvictims gave higher ratings of rationality than
did victims. In contrast, the private setting contained common cues that
might signal danger for sexual assault victims. For example, in the pri-
vate setting scenario, the male person is described as somewhat familiar
looking. This factor may have alerted victims to be cautious since the
majority of sexual assaults against women are perpetrated by someone
they know (BJS, 2001). In the college population, approximately 90% of
female sexual assault victims knew the perpetrator (BJS, 2000). Also, the
scenario takes place in the undergraduate’s dormitory room. Again,
many sexual assault victims were attacked at or in their own homes (BJS,
2000, 2001). Although we cannot know for certain about the settings in
which our respondents were assaulted, sexual assault victims may be
significantly more wary of these two factors relative to nonvictims.
Fear of crime is an important factor when examining scenarios that
take place at night or in public. This result makes sense, as our data sug-
gest that participants’ own behavior is guided by their Fear of Crime. It is
possible that reading the scenarios first and then completing the fear of
crime scale could have primed their fear of crime. However, this is not a
great concern given that predicted differences in ratings of rationality
were found only in the public setting, and if a priming effect occurred,
then it increased the fear for everyone in the public condition. After rat-
ing Ann’s behavior, participants rated how often they behaved similarly
to Ann in this scenario. Fear of crime was positively correlated to self–re-
ported behavior and largely accounted for the relationship between rat-
ings of rationality and prejudice in the public scenario. Fear of crime,
however, did not predict participants’ reactions to the private scenario.
976 KHAN ET AL.
Unfortunately, many people do not practice safety behaviors in dormi-
tory settings. Thus, fear of crime was most likely not salient when
judging this situation.
For all the scenarios, asking the extent to which they behaved similarly
to the woman in the scenario was positively correlated with ratings of ra-
tionality. However, personal behavior was challenging to conceptualize
as a variable, and thus assessing its impact is difficult. When the pilot
study asked participants to rate how often they behaved similarly to
Ann, participants gave very low ratings and would state that no one had
ever asked to use their phone. In response, we clarified the question by
following it with “That is, were you cautious or afraid of someone be-
cause they were male?” Unfortunately, this clarifier is equally vague
since women encounter men throughout their lives. The proportion of
times a woman has behaved cautiously around a male is difficult to
quantify in the absence of situational context. Providing a context such
as, “when you are alone at night in public” might have produced more
accurate and meaningful responses to this question. Nevertheless, rat-
ings of personal behavior provide some insight into how one’s own
behavior influences judgments of rationality.
For a number of reasons, the elevator scenario did not produce any dif-
ferences in ratings. Most participants did not view her behavior as ratio-
nal. As stated earlier, it was difficult for us to predict which cues would
be used in a semi–private situation. Furthermore, this particular sce-
nario took place during the day instead of at night like the other two sce-
narios. An elevator setting in a business office during the day represents
an unlikely scenario for a crime. Had we described this situation as an el-
evator in a city parking garage at night, we may have obtained different
results. Also, the setting in which the student respondents completed the
questionnaire needs to be considered. The university is located in a
small town. Perhaps asking women from large cities to judge this
scenario would have produced different results.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the relation between ratings of
rationality and prejudice. D’Souza’s (1995, p. 286) view of rational dis-
crimination would suggest that there is no link between rationality and
prejudice. That is, discriminatory behavior does not reflect prejudicial
thinking but rather a carefully reasoned assessment. This line of think-
ing is most consistent with the well–deserved reputation theory. In this
study, if participants were to exhibit such rational discrimination, there
would be a nonsignificant correlation between ratings of rationality and
prejudice. In the gender-based scenarios, nonvictims and victims in the
public scenario reflected this type of judgment. They gave relatively
high ratings of rationality and did not see the behavior as reflective of
prejudice. There was no significant correlation between their ratings of
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prejudice and rationality (see Table 2). In contrast, a negative correlation
between ratings of prejudice and rationality would fit with D’Souza’s
description of a “liberal” perspective on discrimination. That is, “liber-
als” view discriminatory behaviors as irrational and prejudicial. Both
victims and nonvictims judged the cabdriver as low in rationality and
high in prejudice. In other words, participants viewed his behavior in a
manner consistent with the scapegoating theory of prejudice. A negative
correlation between ratings of prejudice and rationality was also found
for victims in the private setting scenario. Here, just as in the cabdriver
scenario, victims showed a strong negative correlation between ratings
of rationality and prejudice. However, their mean ratings of rationality
and prejudice suggest a different interpretation. Unlike the cabdriver
scenario, they gave high ratings for rationality and low ratings of preju-
dice to the female. This correlation is not explained by D’Souza’s de-
scription of rational discrimination because a negative relationship ex-
ists between rationality and prejudice as opposed to no relationship. In
other words, they are not embodying “liberal” discrimination as de-
scribed by D’Souza. Although it is speculative, dissonance theory would
suggest that participants may be engaging in an effort to justify their
rational discrimination. In this case, victims may be reflecting an
extreme version of the reasoning described in the well–deserved
reputation theory.
Our research demonstrates that previous experience such as victim-
ization does not lead to rampant discriminatory behaviors. Sexual as-
sault history only predicts responses to a scenario that most likely re-
sembles the context of a person’s victimization experience. The
differences in ratings of rationality between the cabdriver’s and the fe-
male’s discriminatory acts suggest that race- and gender-based discrim-
inations are not seen in similar terms. Both victim and nonvictim partici-
pants seem to be taking the “target’s” perspective into account when
deciding if a discriminatory behavior is rational or not. That men gener-
ally view this type of discrimination as rational (Khan, 2003), whereas
African Americans do not, may account for differences in participants’
judgment.
Both the cabdriver and female scenarios represent real-life situations
in which instantaneous decisions must be made in the absence of indi-
viduating information. Previous social psychological research has
shown the influence of cognitive resources (Devine, 1989; LePore &
Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), mood (Bodenhausen,
Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997), and ter-
ror management (Schimel et al., 1999) on these types of decisions. The
present line of research represents a new angle by which we can under-
stand the use of stereotypes and its links with prejudice and discrimina-
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tion. Rational discrimination is akin to racial profiling, a controversial
practice employed by some law enforcement officials in judging the po-
tential threat of civilians. Of course, the target and perceiver of these acts
of discrimination may have different reactions to these behaviors. Vic-
tims of racial profiling have reported feelings of humiliation and de-
spair. At its extreme, racial profiling has played a role in accidental
shooting deaths by law enforcement officials (Payne, 2001). Future re-
search should explore understanding perceptions of rational discrimi-
nation from both perceivers and targets, so that societal boundaries can
be formed to distinguish between what is rational or not and ultimately
what is fair and unfair from both perspectives.
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